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I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of piracy is nothing new.  The term itself traces back to 500 B.C. 
and the ancient worlds of Greece and Rome, when pirates attacked and looted 
ships sailing the Mediterranean.  In music, piracy roots itself in the 1920s, when 
radio stations played music without compensating artists, despite it being “close to 
* J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, May 2007; B.A., Columbia University, cum laude,
May 2002.  This Article was written while enrolled in the course “Special Problems in the Music 
Industry,” taught with expertise by Professor Marc Goodman at Pepperdine University School of Law 
in the Spring of 2006.  The author would like to thank her mother, a recognized voice of Israel, for 
inspiring this writing; her brother, an aspiring musician and profound writer, who’s editing skills helped 
this Article materialize; and her father, her role model in academia, who initially mocked the notion of 
“moral rights” in the music industry, yet ultimately found the product absolutely necessary for future 
generation’s continued appreciation of one language we all understand—music. 
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impossible” to copy vinyl records.1  During the 1960s, with the advent of the blank 
tape, the public began dubbing mixed tapes and recording live concerts.2  Fast-
forward to 2007 and the prevalence of online piracy, where a relatively young 
phenomenon presents a unique challenge to the music industry and recording 
artists.
The increased challenge for protecting copyrights in the music industry is 
due in large part to the new technology available to the public.  File-sharing and 
peer-to-peer networks are too fast, easy and convenient for the industry to come up 
with effective modes of control and regulation.3  Despite copyright infringement 
issues, artists’ moral interests are also severely jeopardized, since an artist’s work 
is so readily available to the public and “vulnerable to disregard, infringement and 
abuse.”4  In an era when technology—uploading, downloading, burning, 
streaming, copying, file-sharing, hard-drive swapping—is developing at a faster 
rate than the laws regulating it, or which the record companies, publishing houses 
or lobbyists can control, the exigency for moral rights development in copyright 
law must be recognized as a legal priority for the music industry.5
The goal of American Copyright Law embodied in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, reads in pertinent part, “Congress shall 
have Power. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”6  The current focus of this constitutional principle is 
based on an economic paradigm and does not address the significance of moral 
issues pertaining to musical artists. Although U.S. copyright legislation does grant 
a limited version of moral rights to “visual” artists,7 there are no such rights 
afforded to musical artists, or any works that fall outside the definition “work of 
visual art.”8
1 Darcie-Nicole Wicknick, The RIAA Music Downloading Controversy: Both Sides of the Record,
http://www.musicbizadvice.com/a_little_history_on_music_piracy%20.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) 
[hereinafter Wicknick]. 
2  Wicknick, supra note 1.  Piracy exists in four basic categories: first, pirate recordings 
(unauthorized distribution of the sound without packaging, i.e. no liner notes); second, counterfeit 
recordings (unauthorized recordings of the sound and packaging); third, bootleg recordings 
(unauthorized recording of live concerts, radio or television broadcast); and fourth, online piracy 
(unauthorized uploading or downloading of copyrighted material).  RIAA, Anti-Piracy, (2003) http:// 
www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp  [hereinafter Anti-Piracy]. 
3  It is estimated that “[a]t any given moment, five million Americans are participating in file-
sharing, making for a total of 2.6 billion downloads each month.”  Stacey M. Lantagne, Note, The 
Morality of MP3s: The Failure of the Recording Industry’s Plan of Attack, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269,
273 (2004) [hereinafter Lantagne].  Each year, the industry is estimated to lose $4.2 billion to piracy 
worldwide. Anti-Piracy, supra note 2. 
4 Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights and Copyright Harmonisation: Prospects for an 
‘International Moral Right’?, 17TH BILETA ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2-3 (2002),  http://\www.bileta.ac. 
uk/pages/conference%20papers.aspx (follow “Moral Rights and Copyright Harmonisation-Prospects for 
an ‘International Moral Right’” Hyperlink) [hereinafter Sundara Rajan]. 
5 Id.
6 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8. 
7 See 17 U.S.C. et seq. (2006) (commonly referred to as the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990). 
8 Rajan Desai, Music Licensing, Performance Right Societies, and Moral Rights for Music: A Need 
in the Current U.S. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide Moral Rights, 10 U. BALT. INTELL.
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The grant of moral rights would entitle a musical artist to the protection of 
every aspect of each creation, including the protection and respect for the artist’s 
moral intentions and creative content.  I hope to prove that by exercising the 
implication of moral rights, as they pertain to musical copyright, we will generate a 
new and significant perspective in the ongoing discussion of copyright law.  
Ultimately, this will empower us to build a more thorough defensive argument in 
the struggle for protecting the “exclusive Right” of “Authors,” as delineated by the 
U.S. Constitution.9  My goal with this Article is to create a new paradigm in which 
the public, recording companies, publishing houses, and licensing companies 
approach a work of authorship. 
Moral rights (also commonly referred to as droit moral) developed from the 
theory that an artist “expresses his or her personality and individual traits in a work 
and one cannot separate the artist from the work.”10  Moral rights are based on “a 
belief that artistic creation is something more than an attempt to earn a livelihood.  
The creative act results in a special relationship between the creator and his 
work.”11  While copyright is a property right, moral rights are considered a human
right. 
There are at least four types of recognized moral rights: 
(1) attribution: the right to be given credit and to claim credit for a work, and to 
deny credit if the work is changed; (2) integrity: the right to ensure that the work is 
not changed without the artist’s consent; (3) publication: the right not to reveal a 
work before its creator is satisfied with it; and (4) retraction: the right to renounce a 
work and withdraw it from sale or display.12
These rights are independent of and different from traditional copyrights.  As 
opposed to the economic, material and physical nature of current copyright law, 
moral rights do not emphasize economics, but rather the more philosophical and 
less alienable nature of artistic creativity (though the exercise of them may have 
economic consequences, which would not differ from remedies available under 
existing copyright law).13  For this reason, developing moral rights in United States 
copyright law is a challenge—it requires a new understanding by Congress, the 
recording industry, the public, and artists about what it means to be a creator.14  If 
PROP. L.J. 1, 17 (2001) [hereinafter Desai]. 
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8. 
10 Desai, supra note 8, at 11 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  See generally Cheryl Swack, 
Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between 
France and the United States, 22 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 361 (1998) (discussing the historical 
development of the idea to protect artistic creation in continental Europe) [hereinafter Swack]. 
11 Sundara Rajan, supra note 4, at 4 (emphasis added). 
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (8th ed. 2004).  There is also droit de suite, also known as the 
artist resale right, which is closely connected to the concept of moral rights.  Id. at 534. 
13 Patrick G. Zabatta, Moral Rights and Musical Works: Are Composers Getting Burned? 43 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1096-97 (1992) [hereinafter Zabatta].
14 Principally, five groups stand to lose from piracy: (1) music pirates, because the recording 
industry and law enforcement officials are beginning to crack down on the problem; (2) consumers, 
because illegal copying produces inferior quality tracks and furthermore drives up costs of CDs to 
compensate for lost sales; (3) honest retailers, because market prices cannot compete with prices of 
cheap illegal copies; (4) record companies, because eighty-five percent of records released never recoup 
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all these parties can come to understand what moral rights legislation really means,
and not how much money it generates, then it could be possible to conquer piracy 
with a new additional moral element to the United States Copyright Act.15
It must be emphasized that the value of a work of authorship is more than its 
mere financial worth.16  Moral rights benefit artists who view their creation as 
something more than a livelihood, and who would be satisfied with an injunction 
in lieu of monetary compensation to ensure the integrity of a work of authorship.17
But, when, and if moral rights are recognized, there will be a definite economic 
impact on recording contracts, licensing agreements, and reproductions, to name a 
few products of the music industry.18  Those who are concerned with the adverse 
economic effects of moral rights legislation should understand that this legislation 
will only impact economic rights in a limited way. 
I admit, moral rights may not be the ultimate solution for the impact of 
illegal downloading, but there must, at the very least, be a proposal to expand the 
limited reach of economic rights, which by themselves are not protecting the music 
industry from its potential demise.  Even though the public finds the bounty of 
piracy to be cheap and easy, the bottom line is that it is illegal.  Moral rights offer a 
new approach to fight piracy.  Whether or not it is a stronger remedy has yet to be 
seen.  If as a society we intend to protect both the economic value of a work of art, 
as well as the value of the creator’s moral intentions, then we must recognize the 
importance of moral rights legislation. 
This Article seeks to implement a moral rights clause in the United States 
Copyright Act applicable to the legitimate interests of musicians and 
complementary to existing economic principles.  Part II discusses the historical 
framework of moral rights legislation, its prevalence in Europe, and its 
establishment in the United States under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
(“VARA”) of the Copyright Act.19  Part III discusses the current state of affairs, 
America’s reluctance to moral rights in lieu of other legislative remedies, as well 
as the musician’s inferior relationship to recording and licensing companies.  This 
section also addresses why economic-based litigation and legislation are not the 
most productive models to combat music piracy.20  Part IV tackles the deficiencies 
in the current U.S. Copyright Act, and sets forth draft language for “The Moral 
Rights Act of 2007.”21  Part V entertains potential opposition to this Bill, including 
recording companies, publishing houses, illegal file-sharers and digital sampling or 
mashing artists, and focuses on why this opposition should not prevail.22  Part VI 
costs, and consequently, the companies’ reduced income cannot support the development of new artists 
and the expansion of the music business in general; and finally (5) artists, because they lose royalties 
and the respect they ultimately deserve.  Anti-Piracy, supra note 2. 
15 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
16 See Swack¸ supra note 10, at 361-62. 
17 Id.
18 See generally Desai, supra note 8 (discussing the music licensing scheme in the United States). 
19 See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 36-115 and accompanying text. 
21  See infra notes 116-156 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 157-170 and accompanying text. 
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concludes the Article, supporting my belief that the proposed legislation should 
pass constitutional muster, as a logical extension of VARA under the Copyright 
Act, and because it promotes constitutional principles, namely the “Progress” of 
“useful Arts” and the “exclusive Right” of “Authors” “Writings.”23
II. THE HISTORY OF MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Moral rights emerged in Europe in the nineteenth century, following 
centuries of musical, literary, and artistic creativity.24 Moral rights developed 
initially in France and spread to continental Europe to protect an artist’s personal 
right in the overall integrity of his or her work and to protect Europe’s cultural 
property.25  On the other hand, the United States, “[b]usy with the economic 
exploitation” and development of its own country, “perhaps, neglected the arts,”26
resulting in little moral rights legislation.  However, if we turn the clock forward to 
the present day, we find that the United States has now developed an expansive 
artistic legacy of its own.  Thus, to protect the interests of American citizens, the 
need for legitimate and legal defense of moral rights exists now more than ever. 
The European system, via the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, played an important role for the development of moral 
rights in the United States.27 The Berne Convention Treaty sought to harmonize 
moral and economic rights, so that both rights would coexist when a work of 
authorship materialized.28  Principally, the United States motivated to join the 
23  See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text. 
24 Swack, supra note 10, at 363 (citations omitted).  “Throughout time, European cities, ‘from the 
classical Greek period in Athens, the neo-classical in Rome, the medieval and gothic art in various 
continental cities, the high Renaissance in Florence, and the late nineteenth-century impressionism in 
Paris,’ have housed the major centers of art.”  Id.
25 Id. at 363-64.  “French revolutionary laws were similarly concerned with vesting control of 
intellectual works with their creators, combined with the desire to foster the dissemination of 
knowledge and the protection of economic interests.  As with the Venetian privilege, French 
revolutionary laws gave creators control over their works by requiring printers to obtain ‘formal written 
permission’ from authors.  This put creators in a better position not only to secure economic benefits 
but also to limit distortion of their work.”  Thierry Joffrain, Comment, Deriving a (Moral) Right for 
Creators, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 735, 748 (2001) [hereinafter Joffrain].  Some form of moral rights also 
exists in Asia, South America, Africa, Europe, and Canada.  Desai, supra note 8, at 12. 
26 Swack, supra note 10, at 364. 
27 Desai, supra note 8, at 13. 
28 See Paris Act of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].  Although this is beyond the 
scope of this paper, “efforts to harmoni[z]e protection [on an international level] have been consistently 
unsuccessful.”  Rajan, supra note 4, at 2.  However, “[t]he solid presence of moral rights on the 
international copyright scene [discussions including how to incorporate Berne into The Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property/World Trade Organization (TRIPS/WTO) system, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the Copyright Harmonization Directives of the 
European Union] suggests a degree of international consensus that moral rights should be protected.”  
Id. at 4.  Furthermore, music piracy is an international phenomenon, such that the inclusion of moral 
rights legislation in the United States would have a positive impact on the international world via Berne 
principles. 
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Berne Convention because each Berne signatory enjoyed the copyright protections 
of all other signatory nations.29
The United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988, and in doing so, the 
Berne Convention Implementation Act imposed changes to United States 
copyright law.30  Article 6bis of the international treaty of the Berne Convention 
granted authors the moral rights of attribution and integrity, and the U.S. thereby 
needed to comply with this requirement.31  However, the United States only 
exercised minimal compliance with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention “by 
finding that a few copyright provisions, unfair competition law, state statutes, and 
some common law remedies provided enough moral rights protection to meet the 
demands of the Berne Convention.”32
In 1990, the United States implemented VARA, which was the first federal 
legislation to conclusively grant the moral rights of attribution and integrity to 
works of visual art.33  In Europe, there are also the moral rights of divulgation and 
retraction, two rights the United States has yet to consider in any legislation.34 The 
irony is that Congress must have thought moral rights important, because why else 
would Congress allege in 1988 that the United States complied with Berne 
requirements, and two years later, implement VARA?  Unfortunately, despite only 
offering two of the four recognized moral rights, VARA further offers no 
protection for musical works, because they do not fall within the definition of 
“visual art.”35
I will now explore how Congress’ deference to state statutes, common law 
opinions, and economic legislation does not address the need for moral rights and 
the challenges that arise without them. 
29 Joffrain, supra note 25, at 750. 
30 Desai, supra note 8, at 13-14.  The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) administers 
the Berne Convention.  Although there is no “international copyright,” most countries have agreed to 
the basic tenets of: (1) the right to authorize reproduction of an artist’s work; (2) the right to authorize 
translation of the work; (3) the right to authorize public performance of the work; and (4) the right to 
authorize adaptations or alternations to the work.  See RIAA, Copyright Laws available at
http://www.riaa.com/issues/copyright/laws.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Copyright 
Laws]. 
31 Desai, supra note 8, at 13 (citation omitted). 
32 Id. at 14. (citations omitted). See also H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 33-34 (1988).  See infra notes
36-115 (discussing the deficiencies with current copyright provisions, unfair competition law, state 
statutes, and common law remedies). 
33 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (1994). 
34 Desai, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
35 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). 
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III. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
A. United States’ Reliance on Existing Legislation for Moral Rights 
Protection 
Eleven states have passed some form of moral rights protection for artists, 
including California, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
and Louisiana.36  However, none of this legislation includes musician’s rights 
because the definition is limited to fine arts.  For now, a musician cannot look to 
state statutes, but can only rely on moral rights protection under state contract law, 
unfair competition laws, privacy torts or defamation law.37  In terms of federal law, 
the remedies are also limited to a case-by-case analysis, without sufficient redress 
for an artist’s intent.  Such protections do not address the specific goals of moral 
rights legislation and are limited to the remedies provided therein. 
First, a breach of contract remedy is limited to the contractual provisions 
within the contract, and the terms must be agreed on by all parties.  In Vargas v. 
Esquire Magazine, Inc.,38 illustrator Vargas signed a contract with Esquire 
Magazine to publish his drawings of women, which he named “the Varga Girl.”39
After six years, Esquire cancelled the contract, but proceeded to publish three 
drawings under the title, “the Esquire Girl.”  Vargas sued to enjoin the further 
publication of his work, but the Court held that the contract had “divested [Vargas] 
of all title, claim and interest in such drawings and designs.”40  Although not 
specifically mentioned in the case, this is also an example of the “work-for-hire” 
doctrine, which basically exists when a person creates a copyrightable work but 
does not own the copyright in it.41  Thus, the Court allowed Esquire Magazine to 
falsely publish Vargas’ work against his personal interests at stake, a remedy 
otherwise available by the moral rights of integrity and attribution. 
Second, under state unfair competition remedies, a case will only be 
actionable where the proven deception convinces the public to buy the falsely 
attributed product.42  A person may be enjoined from putting an artist’s name on a 
product falsely attributed to him or her and in competition with the artist’s own 
product.  But, what would happen if a digital sampling or mashing musical artist 
uses a sample (albeit licensed) in a manner that diminishes the original creator’s 
artistic vision and exploits such in a different market?43
36 Desai, supra note 8, at 16. 
37 Id.
38 Swack, supra note 10, at 385 (citing Vargas v. Esquire Magazine, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 
1947)). 
39 Id.
40 Id. at 384-385. 
41 The problem is, in a work-for-hire, the remedy is even more tenuous because the artist is not 
considered the creator in the eyes of the law—the employer is considered the original author.  See infra 
notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
42 Swack, supra note 10, at 384. 
43 See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text. 
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Under federal law, particularly the Lanham Act,44 some courts will protect 
the artist’s moral rights even in the absence of clear federal law.  For example, in 
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., the Court found that the 
truncated broadcast by ABC of the Monty Python comedy group violated the 
integrity of Python’s work.45  Despite this holding, the Court conversely could 
have considered ABC’s use a “fair use” as criticism or review, a point which will 
be discussed more thoroughly below.46  Thus, most courts believe the connection 
between the Lanham Act and its ability to protect moral rights is tenuous.47
Though it is clear that some courts would like to recognize moral rights, it is 
difficult for courts to substantiate moral rights in the absence of definitive 
legislation and supportive case law. 
Third, although existing defamation and privacy laws are similar to the 
integrity moral right, defamation does not cover the work itself, but rather the harm 
to an author’s character or name alone.48  In Giesel v. Poynter Products, Inc., the 
illustrator and writer Theodore Geisel, writing under the pseudonym of Dr. Seuss, 
brought an action against Poynter for selling dolls based on his drawings.49
Although Geisel believed that the dolls were of such poor quality that they 
defamed his reputation, the court held that since Poynter exercised “great care, 
skill, and judgment” in creating the doll, there was no injury to Geisel’s 
professional reputation.50  If moral rights existed, Giesel would have a claim for 
infringement of the attribution moral right. 
Under privacy laws, one could obtain protection if his or her name were 
misappropriated, essentially because an economic interest is at stake; however, the 
impact would be more effective if a moral rights aspect is emphasized as well.  For 
example, Tom Waits, who’s distinctive singing style is often imitated in a number 
of commercials, claims, “I have a moral right to my voice.  It’s like property.”51  A 
Spanish court recently confirmed, finding Audi’s use of Waits’ voice in an 
automobile commercial to be more than a property interest, awarding Waits both 
$43,000 for copyright infringement and an additional $36,000 for moral rights 
violation.52  Although Tom Waits won via privacy laws, he himself emphasizes 
that moral rights are equally as important as economic rights.53
44 Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).  The act addresses “[f]alse 
designations of origin and false descriptions.”   15 U.S.C. § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
45 Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976). 
46 See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
47 Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use 14 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 99 (1996) [hereinafter Yonover]. 
48 Desai, supra note 8, at 16. 
49 Swack, supra note 10, at 385 (citing Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968)). 
50 Id.
51 Ben Sisario, Still Fighting for the Right to His Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at E3 
[hereinafter Sisario]. 
52 Id. But see Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the 
remedy for a “sound-alike” suit exists because of “an economic interest akin to that of a trademark 
holder in controlling the commercial exploitation of his or her identity”) (emphasis added). 
53 Sisario, supra note 51, at E3. 
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I now turn to the “fair use” doctrine, because even VARA, the only 
definitive moral rights legislation in the United States, is subject to the fair use 
statute of the Copyright Act.54  The fair use defense states that non-owners of the 
copyrighted work may use the work in a reasonable manner without consent from 
the copyright owner.55  Whether the court allows you to reproduce, distribute, 
adapt, display and/or perform copyrighted works depends on a number of factors.56
It is argued that these factors are difficult to apply in a moral rights regime.57
First, under the purpose and character factor, the term “transformative” directly 
conflicts with the moral right to prevent distortion, mutilation, or modification of 
the original, because an artist presumably believes that any modification devalues 
the original work.58  Second, “nature” of the copyrighted work refers to an 
intangible work of authorship, rather than the tangible “work” created by the 
author.59  The third factor, regarding “amount and substantiality,” is problematic 
because this calls for the subjective measurements of quality and quantity “used” 
by the defendant and the Court.60  The final factor that affects the legality of the 
fair use is the “effect” of such reproduction on potential marketability;61
unfortunately, this factor fails to recognize that moral rights emphasize personal, 
rather than economic investments.62
Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists a number of ways for a use to be 
considered “fair,” including criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, and research.63  However, in music, fair use is principally witnessed in 
the case of a parody of a song, a concept that directly opposes the purpose of moral 
rights.  An often cited case illustrating this point is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc.64  This case involved the rap group 2 Live Crew’s rendition of Roy Orbison’s 
“Oh, Pretty Woman.”  Campbell sought the permission of Acuff-Rose, the 
copyright owners, to use the song “Oh, Pretty Woman.”65  Campbell told Acuff-
Rose that the parody would credit the original authors and copyright owners, and 
that he was willing to pay reasonable royalties for the use of the original in the 
parody.66  Nonetheless, Acuff-Rose, as representative of the original creator, was 
54 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
55 Desai, supra note 8, at 17. 
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). These factors include: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”  Id. 
57 Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 33, 81 (1997). 
58 Id. at 83-86. 
59 Id. at 86. 
60 Id. at 87. 
61 Id. at 88. 
62 Id. at 88-89. 
63 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). 
64 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
65 Id. at 572. 
66 Id.
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not interested in this proposal.67  Campbell paid no attention to Acuff-Rose’s 
objection and published the parody in the album “As Clean As They Wanna Be,” 
still crediting the original authors.68
In essence, 2 Live Crew’s rendition was a form of piracy because the 
underlying work was used without permission, despite crediting the original 
author.  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the parody lyrics were a fair 
use.69  The Court reasoned that if “a work targets another for humorous or ironic 
effect, it is by definition a new creative work,” despite the original author’s 
objections.70
This suggests that someone could claim fair use as a defense for abridging an 
artist’s moral rights, “the special bond that exists between creator and creation.”71
Therefore, without a fair use defense, an artist has a “greater chance of success in 
an infringement suit because of the deference afforded an artist’s reputation and 
honor in a moral rights system.”72
On the other hand, the promotion of creativity is the crux of the Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution, whereby “Progress would be stifled if the author had a 
complete monopoly of everything.”73  Not only can criticism, critique and satire 
“Progress . . . Science,” as dictated by the Constitution,74 but often a piece based 
67 Id. at 572-73. 
68 Id. at 573. 
69 Id. at 594. 
70 Id. at 598-99 (Kennedy J., concurring). 
71 Yonover, supra note 47, at 89. 
72 Brandon G. Williams, Note, James Brown v. In-Frin-Jr: How Moral Rights Can Steal the 
Groove, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L  651, 660 (2000) [hereinafter Williams]. 
73 Diego A. Ramos, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” Luke Took Your Beauty Away, May NAFTA Come to 
Your Rescue?  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Can There Ever Be “Moral Rights” in the United States or 
Puerto Rico, 29 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 173, 182 (1994).   Ramos illustrates a number of cases, where the 
Court held that the public good surpasses an artist’s or copyright owner’s interests.  See e.g. Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 499-500 (1984) (holding that time-shifting allows 
people to copy copyrighted works for viewing at a later time); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (finding that copyright law inspires artistic creativity for the public good). 
 It is stated most eloquently in the patent case of Graham v. John Deere Co. that: “The Congress in 
the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional 
purpose.  Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or 
social benefit gained thereby.  Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose 
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials 
already available.  Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are 
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . 
. . useful Arts.’  This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”  Graham,
383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966). 
74 In Samuel Johnson’s “A Dictionary of the English Language,” the most authoritative dictionary 
in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the first definition for “science” was “knowledge.”  Edward 
C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional 
Power, 43 IDEA 1, n. 42 (2002).  Also, knowledge reflected an important point in common for eight of 
the twelve state copyright statutes, which sought to enact intellectual property rights for the ultimate 
betterment of humankind.  Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1809 (2006).  
President George Washington affirmed this focus in addressing the first Congress: “Knowledge is, in 
every country, the surest basis of public happiness.”  L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 
1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 947 (2003).  This all shows that the 
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on another piece is not intended as an infringement but as a new work in and of 
itself.  Furthermore, a number of other jurisdictions recognizing moral rights also 
accept some form of fair use: i.e. “fair dealing” in England; “free utilization” in 
Germany; and France’s exemption for “parodies, pastiches and caricatures.”75
To rebut this, Professor Ginsburg of the Columbia Law School appeared 
before the House subcommittee considering VARA and said: “The original or few 
copies with which the artist was most in contact embody the artist’s ‘personality’ 
far more closely than subsequent mass produced images. . . .”76  Thus, while fair 
use needs to remain intact to a certain degree, we must recognize that the artist’s 
integrity, reputation, and honor are all at stake in a pirated world.  Artists and all 
the parties who contract with them must understand that full protection exists only 
if a moral rights clause becomes part of American copyright law, which is not 
presently so. 
B. Artists Contract with the Pirates 
The biggest problem an artist faces without moral rights protection is the 
artist contract.  Currently, the industry norm is for an artist, as an original 
copyright owner, to relinquish all authority over his or her work to either the 
record company or the publishing house.77  What makes this so common is the 
existence of essentially two copyrights that exist in a musical work—composition 
rights and performance rights; and therefore two potential economic streams to 
flow from such copyrights—mechanical royalties and performance royalties.78
The problem is that the composition copyright is held by the writer or publisher, 
and the performance copyright, as a mechanical royalty, is held by the record 
Framers did not intend to vest in Congress anything akin to the English royal grant in the creation and 
assignment of monopolistic privileges. 
 Accordingly, when Congress enacted the first national Copyright Act in 1790, the emphasis was on 
the utilitarian public interest model.  The Act was entitled: “‘An Act for the encouragement of learning, 
by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during 
the times therein mentioned.’  If the property right rationale were controlling, a different title would 
have been expected.  For example, titles such as ‘An Act for the protection of authors and proprietors of 
copies, to secure to them their property in maps, charts, and books’ or ‘An Act for securing property of 
authors and proprietors of copies in their maps, charts, and books’ would be more consistent with a 
property right rationale.”  Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting 
the Past and Ignoring Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 427-28 (2004).  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court’s early rulings treated copyright as a statutory creation designed to serve the public 
benefit and only secondarily to reward authors.   See e.g. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) and 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1879). 
75 Paul Nicholas Boylan, Reconciling Artist’s Moral Rights with Economic Principles and the 
Problem of Parody: Some Modest Proposals, 1 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMUNICATIONS (2005),
available at http://www.uclan.ac.uk/facs/class/legalstu/JoLaw&Comms/2005_1/boylan-2.htm 
[hereinafter Boylan]. 
76 Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 
101-514, at 6922 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6922 (statement of Prof. Jane C. 
Ginsburg). 
77 Desai, supra note 8, at 18. 
78 Id. at 19-21. 
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company through the negotiated recording agreement.79  Presently, unless the artist 
is also the composer, in no way is an artist’s moral integrity protected.  Such 
agreements leave an artist without much control over his or her music.80  Not only 
do recording contracts require artists to record exclusively for one record company, 
but contracts also preclude artists from re-recording a selection for another record 
company.81  Consequently, many musicians “sign whatever agreement they get in 
order to ensure some recording deal.”82  In most situations, artists (especially new 
artists) are forced to forfeit any moral rights they potentially have in order to make 
a living.83
For example, “record companies have exclusive rights to reproduction, the 
preparation of derivate works, distribution, and public performance through digital 
audio transmission.”84  And, if record companies merge, a musician can find that 
his or her existing contract and music are no longer held to the original standard.85
Thus, “musicians can easily lose control over their artistic vision based on custom 
in record contracts, without record companies even taking much risk.”86
Another hurdle a musician presently faces is the need to get music played.  
Under the current licensing scheme, any venue that has an American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) license, can play the song or use the 
song in any way they please.87  Even if the artist disagrees with such use, the artist 
cannot prevent such use under existing licensing law.88  But, what happens when 
“a song is played and used out of context,” thereby “desecrat[ing] the song, 
musician, and listeners[?]”89  Musicians should be entitled the right to protect 
against licensing schemes that violate authorship intent, and currently this is not an 
option. 
There are three main types of licenses: mechanical, performance, and 
synchronization.90  First, mechanical licenses permit reproduction in forms that use 
a mechanical device to play sound, such as records and compact discs.91  The 
musical copyright owner is given by law the first right to distribute the mechanical 
recordings, or the “mechanicals.”92  Once distributed for the first time, anyone can 
make his or her own recording of the song and distribute it to the public.93  The 
79 Id. at 19. 
80 Id.
81 Id at 18.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 18-21. 
84 Id. at 19.  To note, although the record companies have such listed exclusive rights, the rights do 
not affect public performance and display rights outside of digital audio transmissions.  Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 2. 
88 Id. at 2-3. 
89 Id. at 3. 
90 Id. at 4-5. 
91 Id. at 5. 
92 Id.
93 Id. at 5. 
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main issue here is that the artist loses control over the future prospects of the work, 
relinquishing personal authority over his or her work and original intent. 
Digital sampling and/or “cover songs” also have potential moral rights 
implications, despite courts focusing on economic implications through 
compulsory licenses.94  If one looks at the case concerning Biz Markie’s 
unlicensed use of a sample from Raymond “Gilbert” O’Sullivan’s 1972 hit “Alone 
Again,” this holding “seems limited to instances where the composer is also the 
copyright owner, as it focuses on the copyright owner’s proprietary rights and not 
on the creator’s moral rights.  As such, it has no direct bearing on the composer’s 
moral rights of attribution and integrity.”95  Therefore, although the artist may 
invoke copyright law under an economic regime, a moral rights system ensures the 
ultimate protection of an artist’s creation when the artist no longer retains the 
copyright. 
Second, performance licenses allow an entity to perform a musical work 
publicly. Performing Rights Societies, such as ASCAP, Broadcast Music, Inc. 
(BMI) and Sesac, Inc. police the use of musical works and distributes royalties 
based on these performances.96  However, these Societies fail to protect use of 
musical works outside their original moral intention, particularly because more 
play means more money, regardless of when or where the song gets played. 
For example, Bruce Springsteen’s song, “Born in the U.S.A.,” was written to 
tell the story of a Vietnam Veteran who comes home to an America “that seems to 
fail him in return.”97  Once Springsteen released the song, he was enraged by 
people who invoked his song as a patriotic anthem.  He refused to sell the licensing 
rights for a Chrysler commercial, an offer estimated to be worth twelve to sixteen 
million dollars.98  Nevertheless, Performing Rights Societies declined to uphold his 
wishes, and used their authority to play the song to invoke patriotism, contrary to 
Springsteen’s intent. 99  Springsteen had no recourse under present law. 
Additionally, many artists are subject to blanket licenses, which enable a 
person to pay an annual fee to play one or more titles in the society’s music 
catalogue.100  These blanket licenses are too “broad” and potentially allow the 
licensee to infringe on an artist’s attribution and integrity rights.101  Ultimately, the 
current licensing laws do not give the artist authority over how and when his or her 
creation is manipulated, performed or distributed.102
94 Id.
95 Zabatta, supra note 13, at 1126-27 (1992) (citing Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. 
Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y 1991) (holding that the artist Raymond "Gilbert" O'Sullivan 
owned a valid copyright, protected against the infringement by rap artist Biz Markie, who without 
obtaining the requisite license, incorporated three words from the copyrighted piece into his hip-hop 
recording). 
96 Desai, supra note 8, at 7. 
97 Id. at 2. 
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2-3. 
100 Id. at 8. 
101 Id.
102 Id.
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The third type of licensing, synchronization, authorizes a musical work to be 
used in an audiovisual piece, such as a motion picture or television show.103  In 
Shostakovich v. 20th Century Fox, a recognized Russian composer objected to the 
use of his music in an anti-communist film.104  The court refused to enjoin the 
names or music because the music was in the public domain and no longer retained 
copyright protection.105  However, the case was also litigated in France, where the 
French court found there was “undoubtedly a moral damage.”106  If moral rights 
were recognized and enforced in the United States, the outcome would most likely 
follow the French rationale.107
The above three licensing examples are usually in the form of a written 
contract.  The problem with such contracts is that they are economic in nature and 
do not address moral rights considerations.  ASCAP, BMI and Sesac need to exist 
because they are important regulators of these licenses, by “provid[ing] a valuable 
service of monitoring use of songs and providing economic returns.” 108
Ultimately, an artist should retain the right to retract such licenses from repeated 
use once the integrity of the work is violated, such as performed out of context or 
sampled inappropriately. 
C. An Economic Paradigm Fails to Combat Piracy Problems 
To combat piracy, the Recording Industry Association of America 
(“RIAA”), the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), and other 
entities within the music and movie industry first used an economic-based 
argument to successfully litigate against peer-to-peer companies in A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., and In re Aimster Copyright Litigation.109  More recently, in 
cases such as Metro-Golden-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., peer-to-peer companies 
have successfully overturned the very legislation created to regulate them.110  Now, 
in a panic, the industry has attempted to sue individual file sharers, who use these 
companies for pirating, promising to do so until consumers “get the message.”111
103 Id. at 9. 
104 Shostakovich v. 20th Century Fox, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff’d, 87 N.Y.S.2d 
430 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949). 
105 Id.
106 Ronald B. Standler, Moral Rights of Authors in the U.S.A. (1998), http://www.rbs2.com/moral. 
htm. 
107 Desai, supra note 8, at 8.  See also Zabatta, supra note 13, at 1125. 
108 Desai, supra note 8, at 21-22. 
109 See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that specific 
knowledge of direct infringement, coupled with a centralized indexing system, made Napster liable); In 
re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that, “if the infringing uses 
are substantial then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service must show 
that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the 
infringing uses”). 
110 See MGM, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (holding that because Grokster did not 
use a centralized server like Napster and Aimster, Grokster did not have control and actual knowledge 
of infringement, thereby imposing no liability for contributory or vicarious infringement). 
111 See Lantagne, supra note 3, at 284.  For example, “[a]mong the 261 lawsuits filed by the 
Recording Industry Association of America on September 8 [2004], the preteen set has figured 
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Unfortunately, these suits have been criticized as being “excessive,” “heavy-
handed,” “horrible” and “counterproductive,” because not only do individual file-
sharers have limited funds to defend litigation, but this is also a “public relations 
nightmare” for artists and the industry as a whole.112  Furthermore, these court 
decisions do not significantly lower the number of people file-sharing.113
Although file-sharing activity immediately declined after these lawsuits ensued, 
file-sharing increased at a higher rate after a short period of time elapsed.114
The bottom line is that economic-based litigation and legislation are not 
solving the problems of piracy.115  I propose that a moral rights approach would 
drive a new incentive for illegal down-loaders to stop pirating.  This incentive 
would first result in increased respect for artists, and in turn, justify profits for the 
recording industry as a whole. 
IV. ADDRESSING THE SOLUTION 
A. Deficiencies in the Current Copyright Act 
1. Expanding “Work of Visual Art” to Parallel Broader 
Terminology in the Copyright Act 
VARA is limited to a “work of visual art,” defined as “a painting, drawing, 
print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or 
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. . . ,”116 thereby 
excluding musical or audiovisual work.117  There are a number of potential 
problems with this limited definition. 
First, the VARA definition directly conflicts with the subject matter 
prominently, along with college students and (to the industry’s embarrassment) a teenaged recent 
immigrant from Poland, whose stash of online music turned out to include mostly recordings of Polish 
folks songs and Hungarian hip-hop – two genres of music not controlled by the five companies that 
‘own’ [ninety] percent of the nation’s music.”  Id.
112 Id. at 284-85. 
113 Id.
114 Maryann Jones Thompson, Files Sharers Running Scared?, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Nov. 2005, 
at 12. 
115 Copyright Laws, supra note 30.  For example, there is the Federal Anti-Bootleg Statute, which 
prohibits the unauthorized recording, manufacture, distribution or trafficking in sound recordings or 
videos of artists’ live musical performances, and violators can be criminally punished with up to 5 years 
in prison and $250,000 in fines.  Id.  There is also the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), 
which allows consumers to make copies of copyrighted material for personal use; the Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA), which allows copyright owners of sound 
recordings the right to authorize public performances of their works; and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1996 (DMCA), which prohibits the manufacture and distribution of devices designed 
for the sole purpose of tampering with technology used to protect copyrighted works.  Id.  Though these 
are effective forms of regulation, they are mainly economic and still do not address the significant issue 
of an artist’s moral interests. 
116 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
117 Id.
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protected in the Copyright Act as a whole, which includes musical works, 
particularly any accompanying words, motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, and sound recordings.118  Thus, I propose that in granting moral rights to 
the artist (as opposed to the economic copyrights which rest with the composer, 
publisher and record company), the Bill must apply to every form of music: from 
tangible media such as compact discs, vinyl albums, analogue cassette tapes; to 
modifications of these media into MP3s, singles, ring tones, master tones; to 
performances of this media such as concerts, music videos, appearances in 
television and motion pictures, and even video games.  A bill covering every form 
of music will ultimately target the stronghold of recording, licensing and 
publishing agreements.  It will ensure that artists are protected in every medium in 
which their work is likely released.  For recording companies, publishing houses 
and licensing societies, this invariably means a new party, with an equally strong 
incentive, looking out for potential infringement. 
Donald Passman would agree.  In his discussion of creative control in All
You Need to Know About the Music Business, he notes that in lieu of an author’s 
moral rights for music or lyrics, artists must protect themselves by putting a moral 
rights concept in their songwriter or publisher contract.119
VARA also defines “work of visual art” to exclude “any work made for 
hire. . . .”120  This involuntary exclusion “effectively makes freedom of speech 
alienable” by placing the economic interest in a work superior to the creative 
integrity and attribution right of the artist.121  In other words, for an entity to 
purchase copyrights or obtain them through work for hire conflicts with the artist’s 
fundamental right to preserve personal expression.122  This directly refutes the 
purpose of moral rights, specifically because “the employee is really the 
instrumentality through which the employer’s creativity is manifested.”123
One may argue that an artist, as an employee, specifically signs a contract 
understanding the nature of the job and that the employer becomes the author.  
However, since the nature of most employment is based on an economic paradigm, 
an employer’s interest in the economic copyright should not also compel an artist 
to relinquish his or her moral rights under works made for hire, unless specifically 
negotiated otherwise.124 Under a newly fashioned work for hire doctrine, the 
employer would maintain authority over the copyright while the artist would retain 
his or her moral right in the work. 
118 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
119 DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 258 (5th ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter Passman]. 
120 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
121 Joffrain, supra note 25, at 790. 
122 Id.
123 Zabatta, supra note 13, at 1134. 
124 Id.
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2. Broadening the Moral Rights Offered to Mirror European 
Counterparts 
VARA specifically grants the moral rights of attribution and integrity, the 
former being a right to be given credit, claim credit, and deny credit if a work is 
changed, and the latter being a right to ensure that the work is not changed without 
the artist’s consent.125  These rights must be recognized in the licensing and 
recording agreement schemes. 
The exclusive right to create a “derivative work” under §106(2) of the 
Copyright Act may appear to parallel “modification” under the integrity or 
attribution moral right.126  However, the right to create a derivative work rests with 
the owner of the copyright,127 which in an economic model is not the creator but 
the recording company.  When someone other than the artist owns both the original 
work and its copyright, any license granted to create a derivative work would 
directly negate an artist’s moral right to prevent modification.128
One may look to “cover songs” or “samples” under compulsory licenses and 
think that moral integrity protection exists for an artist.  If someone “covers” a 
song, they cannot “change the basic melody or fundamental character of the 
work.”129  However, even a “cover song” has moral rights implications, depending 
on who the original publisher administers these rights to and on what conditions.130
By adding a moral rights element to that license, an artist can ensure that the work 
does not fundamentally change, and that the right to authorize derivative works 
complements the integrity right. 
This would also apply in the case of “fair use.”  While criticism, comment, 
news reporting, and research are justifiable ends for the use of an artist’s work, a 
parody should be subject to moral rights approval by the author.  For example, 
while some artists might see potential profit by a fair use, others may not, as seen 
in the 2 Live Crew case.131  The decision should rest with the artist, and then the 
125 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006).  The former allows an artist to “claim authorship of that work;” 
“prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work… which he or she did not create;” and 
“prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work… in the event of a distortion, mutilation, 
or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation….”  The 
latter right serves against “any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work 
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation . . . .”  Id.
126 See § 106(2).  Under the Copyright Act, the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to 
create a derivative work, defined as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted.” § 101. 
127 § 101(2). 
128 Symposium, Peter H. Karlen, What’s Wrong with VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights, 15 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 905, 913 (1993) [hereinafter Karlen].
129 Desai, supra note 8, at 5 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(2) (1994)). 
130 See Passman, supra note 119, at 270-272. 
131 Another great example involves Danger Mouse’s, The Grey Album, which mashed together the 
Beatles’ White Album with Jay-Z’s The Black Album.  While Jay-Z enjoyed the publicity and 
encouraged the use, EMI, who claimed to control the Beatles’ copyright, objected to such use.  See
generally, The Grey Album by Danger Mouse, BANNEDMUSIC.ORG, available at http://www.banned 
music.org/albums/grey_album.php (last visited April 22, 2006). 
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copyright owner once the author(s) passes away, so long as the copyright exists.132
Instead of finding an inherent conflict and discrepancy between the Copyright Act 
and moral rights legislation, these two legal models should work to complement 
each other. 
France, the world leader of moral rights legislation, agrees with this 
rationale.133  The most famous French case involving the right of integrity 
involved painter Bernard Buffet, who “created a painting on the panels of a 
refrigerator.”134  The refrigerator owner, who recognized the economic value of 
each panel, decided to deconstruct the refrigerator and sell each panel as an 
individual work of art.135  This example is similar to a digital sampling artist using 
one piece of a song and selling the sample as a new work.136 Buffet filed suit, 
claiming that his work was an “indivisible artistic unit.”137  The Court recognized 
that modification to the work compromised its artistic integrity, and despite the 
copyright owner’s economic interest, the moral rights of the author were upheld.138
Like the Buffet case, a music recording company, as the new copyright 
owner, could find it more profitable to sell songs as singles rather than as one 
complete album.  But, what if the artist had an artistic vision that the entire album 
was “an experience” and needed to be listened as a whole?  Or, take the example 
of Bruce Springsteen, where licensing companies licensed “Born in the U.S.A.” for 
patriotic gatherings contrary to Springsteen’s intended message.139  The need for 
integrity and attribution rights should remain with the artist, despite any signed 
licensing or recording agreements. 
Also, the law should be expanded to include two additional rights recognized 
under French law.  These two rights are: the right to divulge, otherwise termed the 
right to publication, and the right to retract.140  A principal case regarding 
divulgation involved the artist James McNeil Whistler and his painting “Whistler’s 
Mother.”141  In that case, Lord Eden sued Whistler over the painting of Lady 
Eden.142  Although Whistler arguably completed the work in question, he refused 
to divulge the work.143  Although the Court required Whistler to refund Lord Eden, 
the Court held that Whistler had the inherent right as creator to decide when the 
work was complete, and therefore the buyer could not force the artist to relinquish 
132 See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text (discussing transfer, waiver, and term 
provisions). 
133 See Swack, supra note 10, at 404. 
134 Swack, supra note 10, at 397 (citing Judgment of 30 mai (Buffet c. Fersing), Cour d’appel Paris, 
1962 Receuil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 570, aff’d, Cass. civ., 1965 Gazette du Palais [G.P.] II. 126). 




139 Supra at 97-99. 
140 See Williams, supra note 72, at 657; see also Swack, supra note 10, at 365-66. 
141 See Id. at 658. 
142 Id.
143 Id.
2007 THE MORAL RIGHTS ACT OF 2007 199 
his work.144
The same reasoning from the Whistler case should apply to the music 
industry.  For example, a record company may contract with an artist to complete a 
certain number of albums, but the artist does not like one of the albums, despite the 
record company insisting on the release due to contractual provisions agreed upon 
by both parties.  The moral right of divulgation would give the artist the right to 
decide when the work is ready for distribution, although the artist must then agree 
to refund or partially refund the record company, as in Whistler, to respect the 
economic interest at stake. 
American copyright law should also include the right of retraction, a right 
existing in France since the eighteenth century, which allows an artist “to alter or 
withdraw a work already in distribution.”145  This is “presumably exercised when a 
work no longer reflects its creator’s beliefs and personality,” which are directly 
tied to the work of authorship.146  For example, in the event that the work is 
transferred into another medium, such as a motion picture or ring tone, if this new 
media conflicts with original intent, then the artist should have the right to retract.  
As with the publication right, this right would also be subject to contractual 
compensation provisions, subject to parameters like sale minimums or length of 
the contract.147
3. Re-Writing Transfer and Waiver Provisions 
VARA currently states that moral rights may not be transferred, but those 
rights “may be waived if the author expressly agrees to” do so.148  In terms of 
transfer provisions, “the reality of the marketplace means that authors do place an 
economic value on their work, and inalienable moral rights could be viewed as a 
limitation on the constitutional concept of liberty with respect to an artist’s 
freedom to make a contract.”149  A creator’s refusal to hand over these rights, 
despite the threat of liability or loss of employment, provides evidence that there is 
more than a mere economic value to these rights.150  The main problem with a no 
transfer provision occurs when an author passes away, but the copyright subsists.  
Therefore, to ensure that the moral integrity of a work is upheld so long as the 
work remains protectable by copyright, the inclusion of transferable moral rights 
must be an option for the artist. 
There are also several potential issues with the VARA waiver provisions.  If 
there are joint authors, VARA currently states that waiver can be exercised by one 
144 See Joffrain, supra note 25, at 766. 
145 Swack, supra note 10, at 379. 
146 Joffrain, supra note 25, at 767.  The right of retraction is entirely discretionary, and courts do not 
question an artist’s reasoning for exercising such.  The only requirement is indemnification, which 
makes just sense. 
147 Williams, supra note 72, at 657. 
148 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1)-(2) (2006). 
149 Zabatta, supra note 13, at 1131-32. 
150 Joffrain, supra note 25, at 780. 
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author on behalf of all joint authors.151  This provision is particularly problematic 
for musicians, whose work is often based on joint authorship.  If waiver is 
exercised by one minor artist on behalf of the others, this could be disastrous for 
the principal artists.152  For example, in Seshadri v. Kasarian,153 the Court noted 
that in such a case where the joint work, 
is marred by errors reflecting unfavorably on his coauthor, with quantifiable 
adverse effects on the coauthor’s career, the coauthor might conceivably have some 
legal remedy, but it wouldn’t be under Copyright Act.  We don’t know what it 
would be under: possibly the law of contracts; in Europe it might be a violation of 
the author’s ‘moral right’ (droit moral), the right to the integrity of his work. 
This statement goes a long way to prove that a remedy should be implemented to 
appease all moral interests at stake. 
Another problem with a waiver provision is that it subjects artists to unequal 
bargaining power, whereby artists are invariably forced to sell moral rights to 
contract with a recording or publishing house.  Such waiver provisions highlight 
the economic interests that guide United States copyright law.154  Nevertheless, 
waiver provisions are important for an artist who needs the money.  Ultimately, it 
should be the choice of the artist (or artists in the case of joint authorship) to agree 
to any waiver. 
4. Lengthening the Term 
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended United States 
copyright law to life of the author plus 70 years.155  However, VARA is simply 
limited to life of the artist.  Although moral rights are specifically intended for the 
artist, the copyright holder may be aware of the integrity of the work at stake.  
Under Berne Convention standards, moral rights last as long as economic rights.156
Therefore, I advise that the same term provisions should apply within American 
moral rights legislation, provided that the moral rights are transferred by the 
author(s).
151 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2006).
152 Karlen, supra note 128, at 922. 
153 Seshadri v. Kasarian, 130 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1997).  In this case, a University professor 
sued a former graduate student for copyright infringement, when the student attempted to assign 
copyright under his name alone.  The student countered, noting that the work was jointly prepared and 
therefore, an “author of a joint work is a joint owner entitled to copyright it and license the copyright to 
a third party, subject only to a duty to account to his coauthor for any profits.”  Id. at 801.  The Court 
agreed with the student that the work was jointly authored, despite the professor’s argument that he 
substantially rewrote the student’s draft language and refused to authorize joint acknowledgement when 
the student sought publication. 
154 Boylan, supra note 75.  See also Zabatta, supra note 13, at 1131-1133 (discussing possible 
methods to reduce the disparity in bargaining power). 
155 See 17 U.S.C. § 302, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, 
§ 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
156 Berne Convention, supra note 28, art. 6bis. 
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5. Draft Language: “THE MORAL RIGHTS ACT OF 2007” 
§ 101 Definitions 
(a) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding the following definitions in section 101: 
A “moral right owner,” with respect to any one of the moral rights 
comprised in a copyright, refers to the creator of that particular right, and 
independent of the owner of the copyright. 
§ 106 Exclusive rights in copyrighted works, subject to moral rights approval 
(a) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the beginning of section 106 the following sentence: 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under 
this title has the exclusive rights, subject to moral rights approval, to 
do any of the following: 
§106A Subject matter of moral rights 
(a) Title – This Amendment will now be called the “Moral Rights Act of 
2006” 
(b) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the beginning of section 106A the following section: 
(1) Moral rights protection subsists, in accordance with § 102(a) of 
the Copyright Act, in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.  Works of authorship include the following categories: 
a. Literary works; 
b. Musical works, including any accompanying words; 
c. Dramatic works, including any accompanying 
music; 
d. Pantomimes and choreographic works; 
e. Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
f. Motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
g. Sound recordings; and 
h. Architectural works 
(2) In no case does moral rights protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, or principle. 
(3) Any section within 106A will replace “work of visual art” with 
“work of authorship.” 
(c) Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding to 
subsection (a) of section 106A, the following: Rights of attribution, 
integrity, divulgation and retraction – 
(1) Shall have the right – 
a. To claim authorship of that work, 
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b. To prevent the use of his or her name as the author 
of any work of authorship which he or she did not 
create,
c. To prevent publication if the author is not satisfied 
with any work of authorship, and 
d. To renounce a work and withdraw it from sale or 
display. 
(d) Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by replacing 
subsection (d) of section 106A with, the following: 
(1) Duration of rights – 
a. With respect to works of authorship, the rights shall 
endure for a term consisting of the life of the author, 
unless specifically transferred in who or in part by 
any means of conveyance or by operation of law, 
and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal 
property by the applicable laws of intestate 
cessation.
b. The term shall not exceed the expiry of the copyright 
of the work, subject to Chapter 3 of title 17, United 
States Code, section 302. 
(e) Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by replacing 
subsection (e) of section 106A with, the following: 
(1) Transfer – Transfer provisions are subject to Chapter 2 of title 
17, United States Code, section 201A. 
(2) Waiver – 
a. Moral rights may be waived if the author expressly 
agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed 
by the author.  Such instrument shall specifically 
identify the work, and uses of that work, to which 
the waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only 
to the work and uses so identified. 
b. In the case of a joint work, waiver must be 
consensual to each author of the work. 
c. There shall be no blanket waivers encompassing 
transferability of moral rights.
(f) Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding 
subsection (f) of section 106A with, the following: Remedies for moral 
rights infringement – 
(1) Remedies include – 
a. Injunction, 
b. Damages limited to actual damages or unjust 
enrichment, excluding any right to punitive 
damages, as consistent with the notion that these 
rights are personal and not pecuniary in nature 
c. Further damages sought are appealable. 
(2) In the case of divulgation or retraction, the moral rights owner 
may be subject to refund or partially refund the copyright owner 
for any express agreement not fulfilled, in due part to the 
exercise of the moral rights.
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§ 107 Limitations on exclusive and moral rights: Fair use 
(a) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the beginning of section 107 the following sentence: 
(1) Fair Use is appropriate for – 
a. Criticism, Comment, News Reporting, Teaching, 
Scholarship, and Research. 
b. Parodies are strictly subject to moral rights approval 
by the author(s). 
§ 115 Scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works: Compulsory 
license for making and distributing phonorecords 
(a) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
changing section 115(b)(1) and adding section (b)(1)(a) as follows: Notice 
of Intention to Obtain Compulsory License – 
(1) Any person who wishes to obtain a compulsory license under 
this section shall, before or within thirty days after making, and 
before distributing any phonorecords of the work, serve notice 
of intention to do so on the copyright owner and moral rights
owner. 
(2) There shall be no blanket licenses. 
(b) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding to section 115(c)(1) the following sentence: Royalty Payable under 
Compulsory License – 
(1) The moral rights owner is not entitled to royalties for 
phonorecords made and distributed after being so identified, 
nor entitled to recover for any phonorecords previously made 
and distributed, unless expressly agreed in a written instrument 
signed by the parties otherwise. 
§ 201A. Ownership of moral rights 
(a) In general – Chapter 2 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding the following section after section 201: Ownership of moral 
rights– 
(1) Author Ownership – Moral rights in a work protected under 
this title vests only in the author of the work.  The authors of a 
joint work are coowners of moral rights in the work. 
(2) Works Made for Hire – In the case of a work made for hire, 
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared 
is not considered the author for purposes of this title, unless 
the parties have expressly agreed in a written instrument 
signed by them otherwise that the moral right owner expressly 
assigns the moral rights to the employer or person for whom 
the work was prepared. 
(3) Transfer of Ownership – 
a. The ownership of a moral right may be transferred 
in who or in part by any means of conveyance or by 
operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or 
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pass as personal property by the applicable laws of 
intestate cessation. 
b. In the case of a joint work, transfer must be subject 
to express transfer, consensual to each author of the 
work. 
V. BILL OPPOSITION 
A. The Recording Companies and Publishing Houses 
The most influential group that will oppose the Moral Rights Act of 2007 
will be the recording companies and publishing houses, who currently have the 
most control over an artist’s music with regards to the composition rights, 
performance rights and licensing rights—all customarily signed away in the 
recording or publishing agreement.  Nevertheless, these entities should not fear the 
introduction of broad moral rights legislation.  Once moral rights are recognized in 
this era of digitization, such regulation could help generate more money and fair 
recognition for artists and creators in the industry as a whole by potentially 
elevating the moral awareness of the pirating public. 
“The notion of the greedy record company improperly exploiting artists may 
not be too far from the truth.”157  This greed could be a main source of opposition 
to moral rights legislation for musicians, but it may also be the ultimate 
justification.  The record industry will argue that after the widespread use of free 
music download and file-share sites such as Napster, and successor companies like 
Kazaa and Morpheus, the RIAA attacked the legality of peer-to-peer networks by 
appealing to the moral values of consumers downloading music.158  The record 
industry attempted to use guilt, as well as the potential for legal sanctions, to deter 
copyright infringement.  “The RIAA has argued that downloading an MP3 is the 
equivalent of stealing a CD from a record store. . . . “159  Nevertheless, 
“[a]ccording to a 2003 Gallup poll, a staggering eighty-three percent of thirteen to 
seventeen-year-olds think that file-sharing is morally acceptable.”160  A big reason 
for this sentiment is that individuals believe compact disc prices are too high.161
When one looks at the configuration of the music industry, the consumer sees the 
record company controlling the rights and pocketing most of the money, leaving 
artists in an un-recouped world.162
While it is “hard for many Americans to feel guilty about ‘stealing’ music by 
downloading free MP3s when they consider the recording industry to have been 
157 Desai, supra note 8, at 19. 
158 Lantagne, supra note 3, at 270. 
159 Id. at 277-78. 
160 Id. at 278.
161 Id. at 279. 
162 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the file-sharing cycle, whereby 
immediately after suits are filed, there is a decrease in file-sharing, followed by a subsequent increase in 
file-sharing once suits are settled). 
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stealing from its artists for decades,”163 moral protection for artists could appeal to 
a new value within the up-loader’s and down-loader’s consciousness.  This value 
respects the longevity of moral intentions as well as the economic life to which a 
work is presently entitled.  Instead of lawsuits against individuals based on 
economic incentives for industry moguls, the music industry should focus on the 
moral interests of the artist.  An expansive education campaign to inform the 
public about moral rights, and what this means for artists, could appeal to the 
purchasing power of consumers.  With this new value woven into social 
consciousness, the consumer would feel guilty for stealing from the “struggling” 
artist, rather than the record industry or publishing house conglomerates.  This, in 
turn, would lessen illegal uploading, downloading, and file-sharing.  Not only 
would the artist’s interests be protected, but the record companies would also see 
an economic windfall from the increase in purchased music.
B. Illegal Down-Loaders 
Another group to oppose the Bill would be the millions of Americans who 
benefit from expansive libraries of illegally downloaded music.  The success of 
peer-to-peer file-sharing is in large part due to the fact that such networks “give 
users more control over the entertainment they consume.”164  Moreover, file-
sharing, CD burning and even hard-drive swapping are easy to do. 
The truth is Americans and the public-at-large presently do not have the 
incentive to stop illegal uploading, downloading, and file-sharing.  If we appealed 
to the public’s moral values, there may be the potential for a major shift in the 
public’s perspective with increased respect for the artist.  The solution would be 
for artists to speak publicly about moral integrity, emphasize what it means to them 
personally, and how illegal downloads affect their ability to make a living.  Artists 
could utilize campaign techniques similar to those used in sex education, voter 
participation, or environmental initiatives.  Within this framework, an artist can tell 
the public that he or she will refuse to divulge, or even retract a song, if illegal 
copyright infringement continues.165
The apparent counter-argument is: why would any artist do this?  More 
illegally downloaded music means more people listening to an artist’s music, 
which translates into more merchandise and concert sales—the primary way artists 
make money in today’s market environment.166  At first, this might seem like a 
great sacrifice for an artist.  In the long run, moral rights become an extremely 
valuable concept for artists both economically and creatively.  Since the public 
wants artists to create, artists ultimately hold the bargaining chip.  When the future 
potential and excitement of creativity is jeopardized by negatively affecting the 
163 Lantagne, supra note 3 at 280. 
164 Id. at 274. 
165 See supra note 143-47 and accompanying text (regarding the need for a divulgation and 
retraction right). 
166 Tom Zeller, Jr., Pew File-Sharing Survey Gives a Voice to Artists, NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 6, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/arts/06down.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=11902
40405-aX1OfeWpT7nr4pR7Ff7F3Q. 
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integrity of a work, the public might think twice before it downloads illegal files. 
C. Digital Sampling and Mashing Artists 
Another group to possibly oppose the Bill would be artists who engage in 
digital sampling, a common trend found in electronic and hip-hop music.  As 
Passman says, “[u]nless you’ve been living in a cave for the last few years, you 
know that every rapper on the planet samples freely from other people’s works.”167
This technique, also referred to as “appropriationism,” allows an artist to 
incorporate previously copyrighted work into a new work.168  Currently, there are a 
number of licensing schemes in place before a digital sampling or mashing artist 
can theoretically release an album with samples.  In fact, “[r]ecord companies 
won’t release a recording containing samples without assurances that the samples 
have been cleared” by both the record company owning the sampled recording and 
the publisher of the sampled musical composition.169
But what about clearing the samples with the artist, the true creator?  If a 
sampling or mashing artist misappropriates another artist’s original creation, then 
there are largely pecuniary remedies to make the original artist seemingly whole 
again.  If such sampling offends an artist’s moral rights, then under moral rights 
legislation, the artist would have authority to say that he or she does not want his 
or her work attributed to the sample.  The artist would have the right to retract that 
sample.  Just as digital sampling artists must succumb to compulsory licensing 
schemes, such samplers should also come to understand a release on a license 
might offend an artist’s moral rights.170  This is not much more an extension of 
rights clearance than presently exists. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The most apparent reason to explain why moral rights have been excluded 
from United States Copyright Law is that there is a fear that the existence of 
personal rights for artists would negatively impair the social goals, and invariably 
the economic framework, of copyright law in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
United States Constitution.  On a social level, can you imagine every artist in 
America claiming moral integrity, attribution, publication and retraction rights to 
works of authorship?  The enforcement of an artist’s creative rights would 
seemingly result in increased litigation, greater expense to the public, and limit 
widespread dissemination of information.171
Ultimately, the long experience of many nations indicates that recognizing moral 
167 Passman, supra note 119, at 306. 
168 Williams, supra note 46, at 653.  Digital sampling is a popular mode of expression for modern 
artists and musicians. These artists argue that instead of being a “banal and uncreative reproduction of 
an original work of authorship. . . . the replication of an original work by another artist is a novel form 
of artistic criticism, a post-modern artistic approach referred to as ‘pastiche.’”  Id.
169 Passman, supra note 119, at 307. 
170 See Desai¸ supra note 8, at 21-22. 
171 See Joffrain, supra note 25, at 776. 
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rights and restricting their alienability is not obviously lethal to such goals as 
equitable remuneration or public dissemination.  The issue then seems not whether 
moral rights and economic rights can cohabit, but how some combination can be 
most beneficial to society.172
In my view, the combination of moral and economic rights benefits society 
when the creator, who has a personal stake and familiarity with the work, takes 
responsibility and holds ultimate moral title to his or her creations.  Proper 
attribution helps the public recognize a work’s authenticity.  Retraction may solve 
concerns associated with technology, where information is widely disseminated 
against an artist’s wishes.  Integrity allows an artist to control future uses of his 
works, such as a parody or sample, which are currently at the disposal of the record 
company or publishing house.  Finally, a publication right may inspire an artist to 
create a greater number of works, and because of a heightened interest in those 
works, there may be an impetus to improve personal standards, and thereby 
enhance artistic quality overall.173
We all know the problem: music piracy is rampant.  A kid illegally 
downloading music in his or her college dorm is just as culpable as a pirate with a 
peg-leg storming a ship on the high seas for booty.  Piracy is the impetus for us to 
promote the importance of moral rights.  Once the public becomes informed that 
such rights exist, recording companies will be justly compensated, legal download 
quality will increase for consumers, and artists will finally receive the protection 
they deserve. Thus, despite a threat of increased litigation or a periodic decline in 
dissemination, moral rights must be considered and enacted into the United States 
Copyright Act. 
Moral rights legislation will work because it has been tried and tested.  These 
rights have existed in Europe for centuries, with great success and little disruption 
to the copyright system and the profitability of the recording industry, including 
the economic and creative well-being of artists.  Congress has already 
implemented VARA, and now needs to take moral rights protection one step 
further to protect the music industry. 
172 Id. at 777. 
173 “To put it negatively: a distributed work which is not an accurate reflection of an author’s skill 
discourages learned people from composing—or at least from getting an advance for—future works.”  
Mike Holderness, Moral Rights and Authors’ Rights: The Key to the Information Age¸ JOURNAL OF 
INFORMATION, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 4 (1998), http://www.poptel.org.uk/nuj/mike/jilt-mr.htm. 
